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Asset Purchasers as Potentially
Responsible Parties Under Superfund*
I. INTRODUCTION

Whether or not asset purchasers can be held liable under "Superfund"
has been a source of much litigation in the past few years. The debate has
centered on the conflict between successor liability under traditional
common law and the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) desire to
expand successor liability beyond the common law. 1 The U.S. Supreme
Court has not ruled on this issue, as it pertains to Superfund, and the Circuit Courts are divided in their rulings. 2 This Comment will argue in favor
of the traditional approach and against the EPA's expansive approach. Part
II will establish the background and history of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) as it
relates to traditional corporate law. In addition, it will discuss the EPA's
attempt to expand the list of potentially responsible parties under
CERCLA. Part III will discuss the general rule that asset purchasers are
not liable, under traditional corporate law, as successors in interest. Part III
will also explore the traditional exceptions to that rule. Part N will discuss
the history and reasoning behind the substantial continuity test as applied
to CERCLA. Part V will analyze the various rationales and policy considerations supporting the substantial continuity approach and provide arguments against applying this test to CERCLA liability. Part VI will conclude the Comment.

*

Copyright © 1998 by Curtis J. Busby.

1. 4 JACKSON B. BATILE & MAXINE I. LtPELES, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: HAZARDOUS WASTE
288 (2d ed.1993) (citing C. M .. PRICE, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE SHAREHOLDERS AND SUCCESSOR
CORPORATIONS FOR ABANDONED SITES UNDER THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE,
COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT, June 13, 1984, 11-12 (hereinafter "EPA Memorandum")).
2. Circuit cases using the Traditional common law approach include: Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Ry. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 1997 WL 792675, *1 (9th Cir. 1997); Aluminum Co. of
America v. Beazer East Inc., 124 F.3d 551 (3d Cir. 1997); SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Rohm &
Haas Co., 89 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 1996); City Management Corp. v. United States Chemical Co., 43
F.3d 244 (6th Cir. 1994); John S. Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co., 992 F.2d 401 (1st Cir. 1993);
Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240 (6th Cir. 1991); and, Smithland &
hnprovement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1988).
Circuit cases supporting the EPA's preferred rule (hereinafter the "substantial continuity test")
include: B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Carolina
Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Mexico Feed, 980 F.2d 478 (8th
Cir. 1992); and, Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1990).
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II. BACKGROUND

On December 11, 1980 Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), commonly known as "Superfund."3 CERCLA was passed in the wake of the
Love Canal incident,4 where the Hooker Chemical and Plastics Co. had
deposited nearly 22,000 tons of industrial waste on a sixteen acre site in
Niagara Falls, New York. The chemical company buried the waste and
then sold the site to the Niagara Falls Board of Education for $1. Homes
and schools were later built on or near the site. In the mid 1970's Chemicals began seeping into residential basements, and by 1979 the New York
Commissioner of Health ordered an area of the site vacated by all families
with pregnant women and children under the age of two. 5
The EPA recognized that none of the then-existing environmental laws
enabled the EPA to adequately address environmental problems like Love
Canal which pose a public health threat.
Congress drafted CERCLA in order to provide the EPA with a
powerful means of responding promptly and effectively to
cases of environmental contamination ....
. . . CERCLA empowers the EPA to respond to the actual
or threatened release of a hazardous substance ... by conducting the cleanup itself and suing a wide range of responsible
parties for reimbursement ....6

Specifically, CERCLA lists four broad categories of "covered persons" which may be held jointly and severally liable for the cost of clean
up as Potentially Responsible Parties (PRP's). 7 PRP's include:
(1) owners and operators of vessels or facilities;

(2) persons who at the time of disposal of hazardous
substances owned or operated a facility where such substances
were disposed of;
(3) generators of hazardous substances or any person who
arranges for their disposal or treatment; and
(4) transporters of waste, if they participate in the selection of
the disposal site or facility. 8

3. PUB. L. No. 96-510, 94 STAT. 2767 (1980), codified as 26 U.S.C. § 4611 & 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601 (1997).
4. 4 BATTLE & L!PELES, supra note I, at 179-180.

5. /d.
6. !d.
7. Aluminum Company of America v. Beazer East, Inc., 124 F.3d 551, 552 (3d Cir. 1997).
8. !d. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l)-(4) (1997)).
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The consequences of being labeled a PRP can be devastating. One author likened CERCLA to a bus "carreen[ing] through the countryside and
crush[ing] all obstacles in its way."9
[PRPs] are strictly, jointly, and severally liable for the cost of
cleaning up an abandoned or uncontrolled hazardous waste
site. PRPs are also liable for any damages to natural resources
resulting from the release of a hazardous substance. Courts
construe CERCLA liability broadly and liberally so as not to
frustrate CERCLA's major purposes or to create loopholes in
CERCLA's liability scheme. Exceptions to CERCLA liability
are construed narrowly. 10
Notwithstanding its power as a tool in the EPA's hands, CERCLA is
not without its weaknesses. For instance, "CERCLA was drafted behind
closed doors before being passed hastily by a lame duck Congress before
its adjournment, a process that resulted in an ambiguous and confusing
statutory and legislative history." 11 As a result, there is very little legislative history which would help explain the intent of Congress. 12 CERCLA
was later amended and reauthorized on October 17, 1986 under the name
of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA). 13 Among
other things, SARA increased the size of Superfund from $1.5 to $8.5 billion.14 While SARA is not as ambiguous as CERCLA, it is certainly not a
"paradigm of clarity either." 15
As a result of this ambiguity and the enormous potential for liability,
CERCLA and SARA have generated a tremendous amount of litigation,
much of it centering on whether a particular party is a PRP. The litigation
involves either the EPA seeking reimbursement from a PRP or one PRP
seeking cost recovery or contribution from another PRP. 16
In an effort to broaden the reach of CERCLA, the EPA has sought to
expand the list of PRPs to include individuals or corporations who purchase the assets of PRPs. In 1984 the EPA's Administrator for Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring issued a memo wherein she outlined a
policy in which the EPA would encourage the courts to adopt the more

9. 4 8ATILE AND L!PELES, supra note I, at 179.
10. VALERIE M. FOGLEMAN, HAZARDOUS WASTE CLEANUP, LIABILITY, AND LJT!GATION I
(1992).
II. /d. at5.
12. /d.
13. PUB. L. No. 99-499, 100 STAT. 1613 (1986), codified as 42 U.S.C. § 9601 & 10 U.S.C.
§ 211 (1997).
14. 4 BATILE & LIPELES, supra note I, at 182.
15. FoGLEMAN, supra note 10, at 5.
16. 4 BATILE & LlPELES, supra note I, at 182.

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

354

[Volume 12

expansive substantial continuity test with regard to successor liabiiity. 17
Essentially, this test expands liability to include purchasers of assets who
might otherwise not be liable under traditional corporate Law.
ill. TRADITIONAL CORPORATE LAW AND SUCCESSOR LIABILITY

Under traditional corporate law, there is a "universally accepted general rule that a corporation which purchases the assets of another corporation does not, simply by virtue of the asset purchase transaction, become
liable for the obligations of the seller." 18 However, there are four traditional exceptions in which an asset purchaser may be deemed liable as a
successor if:
(1) the purchasing corporation expressly or impliedly agrees to
assume the liability;
(2) the transaction amounts to a 'de-facto' consolidation or
merger;
(3) the purchasing corporation is merely a continuation of the
seller corporation; or
(4) the transaction was fraudulently entered into in order to
escape liability. 19

Thus, an asset purchaser generally would not be liable as a successor
unless one of these four exceptions applied. 20 The remainder of Part ill
will briefly discuss each of these exceptions in the context of CERCLA. A
more complete analysis of the various arguments for or against the application of the traditional corporate law rule will be given in part IV.
A. The Purchasing Corporation Expressly or Impliedly Agrees to
Assume the Liability

Whether or not a corporation assumed the liabilities of its predecessor
is generally a concern of contract interpretation. 21 "There has never been
any doubt that an acquiring company could assume the target company's
contingent future liabilities. " 22
The Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of implied assumption of liability by an asset purchaser in Louisiana-Pacific v. Asarco. 23 However, the

17.
18.

/d. at 288.
City Management Corp. v. United States Chemical Co., 43 F.3d 224, 251 (6th Cir. 1994).

19. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, 909 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir. 1990).
20. United States v. Mexico Feed, 980 F.2d 478, 487 (8th Cir. 1992).
21. Lisa Cope, Comment, Who Should Pay Cleanup Costs-The Federal Response to
Corporate Successor Liability Under CERCLA, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 539, 549 (1992).
22. RONALD J. GILSON, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 1099 (1986).
23. 909 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1990).
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court declined to rule on this issue because the plaintiff failed to raise it at
the district court level. Despite this, the court did offer some guidance
when it stated that "the question of implied liability is a fact specific issue,
and additional facts would have to be developed" at the district court level.
Thus, it appears that a court may find an asset purchaser liable as a PRP
under CERCLA if it can be shown that the purchaser impliedly assumed
the liability. 24
In Aluminum Co. of America v. Beazer East Inc., 25 the Third Circuit
addressed the issue of express assumption of liability by an asset
purchaser. The Beazer court held that the asset purchaser (Beazer) expressly assumed the liabilities of the now dissolved predecessor (ALT
Corp.). ALT was the party actually responsible for the original contamination. In 1954 Beazer purchased the assets of ALT Corp. As part of the
agreement Beazer expressly assumed all of the liabilities of ALT Corp.
Because the agreement was found to be clear and unambiguous Beazer
was deemed to have "assum[ed] 'all of the liabilities and obligations of
[ALT Corp.] whatsoever.' " 26 The court concluded that although the
agreement occurred years before the existence of CERCLA, Beazer's assumption of liability was sufficiently broad to include CERCLA liability. 27
Beazer argued that under Delaware law a corporation's liabilities cease
to exist three years after dissolution. Since ALT was dissolved in 1957, its
liabilities ceased with it. Therefore, Beazer argued, it should not be liable
under CERCLA. The court agreed that under Delaware law a creditor cannot enforce a corporate obligation three years after dissolution. However,
the court held that this does not mean that "when a separate entity has received assets of a dissolved corporation and assumed its corporate liabilities, a creditor may not bring a suit to enforce that obligation against the
continuing entity."28 The court held that Beazer "is an ongoing entity, with
an existence separate from the dissolved corporation, which received corporate assets and assumed corporate obligations, and which existed both at
the time ALCOA and CBI's CERCLA claims arose." 29 Thus, the court
found that Beazer succeeded to ALT 's CERCLA liabilities by express assumption.30

24. See United States v. Chrysler Corp., 31 ERC 1997 (D. Del. 1990) (The court closely
examined the purchasing agreement and held that there was an express assumption of liability and
therefore the purchasing corporation was liable as PRP under CERCLA).
25. 124 F.3d 551 (3d Cir. 1997).
26. /d. at 555, (quoting A5158).
27. !d.
28. !d.
29. /d.
30. /d. at 16.
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B. The Transaction Amounts to a 'De-facto' Consolidation or Merger
An asset purchaser may be liable under the de-facto merger exception.
In general, a transaction is in reality a de-facto merger when:

(1) there is a continuation of the enterprise of the seller in
terms of continuity of management, personnel, physical location, assets, and operations;
(2) there is a continuity of shareholders;
(3) the seller ceases operations, liquidates, and dissolves as
soon as legally and practically possible; and
(4) the purchasing corporation assumes the obligations of the
seller necessary for uninterrupted continuation of business
operations. 31
All four of these factors are required in order to find a de-facto merger? 2
The Ninth Circuit in Louisiana-Pacific held that a continuity of
shareholders is essential in determining whether or not the transaction
amounts to a de-facto merger? 3 Continuity of shareholders occurs where
an asset purchaser pays for the purchase with shares of stock. 34 Thus, the
shareholders in the selling corporation continue to have an interest in the
assets which they sold.
In Louisiana-Pacific, the Asarco company operated a copper smelter
in Washington State. Asarco was being sued by two PRP's, including Industrial Mineral Products (IMP), "for recovery of costs incurred in
cleaning up the release of hazardous waste." 35 Asarco then sued L-Bar
Inc., claiming L-Bar was a successor in interest to IMP because L-Bar had
purchased all of the assets of IMP. 36 Asarco claimed that L-Bar was the
successor in interest to IMP under the de-facto exception.
The court ruled that L-Bar, as an asset purchaser, was not a PRP under
CERCLA. The court reasoned that although some of the seller's
shareholders now held stock in the purchasing corporation, no stock was
exchanged as part of the sale. The court found that there was no continuity
of shareholders because stock was not used as part of the purchase price of
the assets. The stock was bought independently on the open market by the
shareholders in question. 37

31. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco Inc., 909 F.2d 1260, 1264 (9th Cir. 1990); see also
SmithKline Beecham v. Rohm & Haas Co., 89 F.3d 154, 162 n.6 (3d Cir. 1996).
32. Cope, supra note 21, at 552.
33. Louisiana-Pacific, 909 F.2d at 1265.
34. !d. at 1264.
35. !d. at 1262.
36. /d.
37. /d. at 1265.
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The Transaction Was Fraudulently Entered Into in Order to Escape
Liability.

The rationale behind this exception is to avoid assets being transferred
in an effort to defraud creditors. 38 "The creditors defrauded by the transfer
may, in equity, follow the property into the hands of the new corporation."39
The issue of fraudulent transfers was discussed in relation to CERCLA
in City Management Corp. v. U. S. Chemical Co. 40 In this case, City Management purchased the assets of U.S. Chemical. City Management then
sued U.S. Chemical seeking a declaratory judgement stating that City
Management, as an asset purchaser, was not liable for the seller's
CERCLA liabilities. 4I Other PRPs claimed that the asset purchase was
fraudulent, and therefore City Management was potentially liable under
CERCLA.42 The court determined that state law should apply and held that
under the Michigan Fraudulent Conveyance Act the party alleging fraud
must "show that the conveyance was made 'without fair consideration.' "43
According to the Act, "fair consideration" does not require an exact
equivalent, but only a fair equivalent of the value of the property. 44 Thus,
the court agreed with the district court's ruling that City Management's
payment of $720,000 for U.S. Chemical's assets, valued at $1 million, did
amount to fair consideration. Consequently this transaction did not violate
Michigan's Fraudulent Conveyance Act. City Management was therefore
not liable as a successor corporation under CERCLA. 45
D. The Purchasing Corporation Is Merely a Continuation of the Seller
Corporation
"The traditional 'mere continuation' exception to the general rule of
purchaser non-liability 'encompas[es] the situation where one corporation
sells its assets to another corporation with the same people owning both
corporations.' "46 Essentially, under the "mere continuation" theory "a corporation is not to be considered the continuation of a predecessor unless,
after the transfer of assets, only one corporation remains, and there is an

38. 15 WILLIAM M. FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 7125 (penn. ed. rev. vol. 1990).
39. !d.
40. 43 F.3d 244 (6th Cir. 1994).
41. /d. at 249.
42. /d. at 253.
43. /d. at 254 (citing Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.15 (1990)).
44. !d. (citing Mich. Comp. Laws§ 566.13(a) (1990)).
45. /d.
46. /d. at 251 (citing Turner v. bituminous Casualty Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 878 n.3 (Mich.
1976)).
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identity of stock, stockholders, and directors between the two corporations."47
The "substantial continuity" test evolved from the "mere continuation"
exception and is a more expansive approach to successor liability. 48 Essentially this approach considers the following factors to determine if there is
a "substantial continuity" between the two corporations:

(1) retention of the same employees;
(2) retention of the same supervisory personnel;
(3) retention of the same productions facilities in the same
location;
(4) production of the same product;
(5) retention of the same name;
(6) continuity of assets;
(7) continuity of general business operations; or
(8) whether the successor holds itself out as the continuation of
the previous enterprise. 49
The EPA has encouraged the use of this test in an effort to expand the
number of potentially responsible parties under CERCLA. 50 This test goes
beyond the four traditional exceptions to the general rule of successor
corporation non-liability.

IV. THREE CIRCUITS THAT HAVE APPLIED THE SUBSTANTIAL
CONTINUITY DOCTRINE TO CERCLA ANALYSIS OF THE
SUBSTANTIAL CONTINUITY DOCTRINE
In United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., Carolina Transformer
had a site, contaminated with polychorinated biphenyls (PCB's), which it
had owned from 1959 to 1984. 51 In 1984 the EPA ruled that there was a
"threat of release of PCB' s into the environment" and therefore instructed
Carolina Transformers to conduct cleanup operations. 52 By the end of
1984, Carolina Transformers had transferred most of its assets to
FayTranCo. 53 FayTranCo had been incorporated in 1979 and its board of
directors consisted of former officers of Carolina Transformer. 54 The court
ruled that the successor corporation (FayTranCo) would not have been lia-

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

United States v. Carolina Transformer Co .• 978 F.2d 832, 838 (4th Cir. 1992).
United States v. Mexico Feed, 980 F.2d 478, 487 (8th Cir. 1992).
Carolina Transformer, 978 F.2d at 838.
See supra text accompanying note 17.
Carolina Transformer, 918 F.2d at 834.
/d. at 835.
/d. at 839.
/d. at 835.
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ble under a mere continuation theory because there was no overlap of
shareholders between the two companies. 55 However, the court did find
FayTranCo liable under the more expansive "substantial continuity" approach.56
The court reasoned that there was substantial continuity between
FayTranCo and Carolina Transformers; therefore FayTranCo was liable as
a PRP under CERCLA.57 The court found that nearly all of Carolina's employees and supervisors went to FayTranCo and performed the same jobs
at the same salary. Also, FayTranCo produced the same product and acquired most of the assets of Carolina Transformers. Finally, the former
president of Carolina Transformers continued to have a substantial influence in the affairs of FayTranCo. 58 The court stated that "[t]he record as a
whole leaves the unmistakable impression that the transfer of the Carolina
Transformer business to FayTranCo was part of an effort to continue the
business in all material respects yet avoid the environmental liability arising from the PCB contamination ...." 59 For this reason, the court felt justified in utilizing the broad substantial continuity approach. 60
The court determined that FayTranCo had purchased the assets of Carolina merely as a means to avoid CERCLA liability. 61 The court stated that
they were unwilling to allow a corporation to split off a part of its operation, which was responsible for the environmental contamination, and then
continue the rest of its operations under a new name in order to avoid environmentalliability. The court reasoned that "such a result ... would not
serve the remedial purposes of CERCLA, nor would it further the Congressional intent [ofCERCLA]."62
In B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 63 the Second Circuit commented on the
remedial purposes of CERCLA. The court used the substantial continuity
theory to impose successor liability upon various asset purchasers in order
to "fulfill that purpose."64 In this case, hazardous waste had been deposited
into two separate landfills in Connecticut. 65 Numerous PRPs sought contribution from numerous other PRPs. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of those defendants who claimed they were not liable as

55. /d. at 838.
56. /d. at 840.
57. Jd. at 841. (The district court awarded response costs of $977,921.01 and punitive
damages totaling three times that amount, or $2,933,376.03. Thus, the total cost amounted to
$3,922,684.04).
58. /d. at 841.
59. /d.
60. /d.
61. /d.
62. /d. at 840.
63. 99 F.3d 505 (2d Cir. 1996).
64. /d. at 519.
65. /d. at 51 I.
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asset purchasers under traditional corporate law. 66 The Second Circuit reversed the summary judgement ruling under the theory of "substantial continuity."67 The court ruled that since CERCLA was a remedial statute, it
should be construed liberally in order to "give effect to its purposes." 68
These purposes "include facilitating efficient responses to environmental
harm, holding responsible parties liable for the costs of the cleanup ... and
encouraging settlements that reduce the inefficient expenditure of public
funds on lengthy litigation."69
Likewise, in United States v. Mexico Feed, the Eighth Circuit upheld
the substantial continuity test finding it consistent with the goals of
CERCLA. 70 Mexico Feed and Seed had previously leased land to Pierce
Waste Oil Service (PWOS). PWOS stored waste oil in tanks located on the
leased property. Over the years waste oil had either leaked or been spilled
onto the property. In 1983, PWOS sold its assets to Moreco and later
PWOS was dissolved. In 1984, the EPA cleaned up the site and then sued
to recover its costs. Among others, the EPA sued Mexico Feed as the
owner of the property. The EPA also sued Moreco by claiming Moreco
was the successor of PWOS under the substantial continuity doctrine. 71
The court justified using the substantial continuity approach, because it felt
CERCLA was directed at imposing liability upon those parties that are responsible; and this test would prevent responsible parties from escaping
liability. 72 The problem, the court reasoned, is this test could potentially
hold non responsible parties liable for the cost of cleanup. The court dramatized its view of successor liability when it stated, "Congress could not
have intended that those corporations be enabled to evade their responsibility by dying paper deaths, only to rise phoenix-like from the ashes,
transformed, but free of their former liabilities."73
It is important to note that while the Mexico Feed court upheld the
substantial continuity doctrine, it also found that the asset purchaser
(Moreco) was not a substantial continuation of its predecessor (PWOS)
and therefore not liable under CERCLA. 74 The court held that the asset
purchaser in this case (1) was a larger pre-existing corporation and did not
consist entirely of the predecessor's assets, (2) had previously been a competitor of the predecessor, and (3) had no notice of the contamination. 75

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

/d. at 513.

/d. at 520.
ld. at 514.
ld.
United States v. Mexico Feed, 980 F.2d 478, 488 (8th Cir. 1992).
ld. at 483.
/d. at 488.
/d. at 487.
/d. at 490.
/d. at 489.
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V. ANALYSIS OF THE SUBSTANTIAL CONTINUITY DOCTRINE
The facts of the preceding cases would seem to justify application of
the substantial continuity doctrine in CERCLA, because it appears that
without such a broad test a responsible party may escape liability. However, closer examination reveals significant flaws in the reasoning supporting this broad interpretation of successor liability. Utilization of this test
would require the fashioning of federal common law because of the general rule that asset purchasers are not liable as successor corporations unless one of the four traditional exceptions applies.

A. Improperly Fashioning Federal Common Law
1.

The Anspec court's analysis

In Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 76 the Sixth Circuit Court
noted that a successor corporation would be liable under CERCLA.
However, it is important to note that an asset purchaser is not necessarily a
successor corporation. In 1978, Anspec purchased land with improvements
from Ultraspherics Corp. In 1987, Ultraspherics merged with Hoover
Group, which was designated as the surviving corporation of
Ultraspherics. Prior to selling the land to Anspec, Ultraspherics deposited
hazardous waste into various underground and above ground tanks located
on the property. As a result of this disposal, hazardous waste was "routinely released into the soil and ground water.'m In its decision, the court
concluded that there is an important distinction that must be made "between interpreting a statute and fashioning federal common law.'' 78 Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court has noted that "the authority to construe a
statute is fundamentally different from the authority to fashion a new rule
or to provide a new remedy which Congress has decided not to adopt." 79
Prior to the circuit court's ruling in Anspec, the district court determined that including the term "successor corporation" within the definition
of "person" would, in effect, be fashioning federal common law and federal common law cannot be formed when the statute is clear and unambiguous.80
The Sixth Circuit held that § 101 (21) of CERCLA clearly defines who
is liable as a "person" under§ 107(a)_BI Although Congress did not specifically include "successor corporations" within the definition of "person"
(under CERCLA § 101(21)), the court ruled that the definition of "person"

76. 922 F.2d 1240 (6th Cir. 1991).
ld. at 1243.
78. ld. at 1246.
79. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, 451 U.S. 77, 97 (1981).
80. Anspec, 922 F.2d at 1244.
81. ld.

77.
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under CERCLA 101(21) includes the term "corporation," and there is a
"universally accepted rule that a reference to liability of corporations includes successors." 82 The court added, "[w]e are not creating or fashioning
federal common law when we adopt an interpretation of a statute that is in
harmony with a universally accepted rule of law."83 This universally accepted rule includes successor corporations within the term corporation. 84
The court held that it was merely interpreting a word within the statute "to
include one of its generally accepted components." 85
However, utilization of the substantial continuity test to find asset purchasers liable as successor corporations would require the fashioning of
federal common law since asset purchasers generally do not incur successor liability. 86 As discussed previously in Part III of this Comment, under
traditional state corporate law an asset purchaser only becomes a liable
successor when one or more of the four recognized exceptions applies. 87
And while the "mere continuation" exception is one of the four recognized
exceptions, the broader "substantial continuation" exception is not. 88 Indeed, the "substantial continuation" exception is not recognized at all in
most states. 89 Thus, by expanding the definition of successor corporations
to include asset purchasers, the courts are fashioning federal common law.
It is universally accepted "that a corporation that purchases the assets of
another corporation does not, simply by virtue of the asset purchase transaction[], become liable for the obligations of the seller. " 90
It should be noted, however, that whether Hoover was a liable successor under state law was not at issue in Anspec. An applicable Michigan
statute provided that any corporation surviving a merger took on all liabilities of every party to the merger. 91 Hoover was the designated survivor and
so, under the statute, it was the liable successor. Had there been no Michigan statute on point, the court would have had to look to traditional state
corporate law to find Hoover liable as a successor under the de-facto
merger exception or, that failing, fashion a new federal common law rule
holding Hoover liable as a mere asset purchaser. As it was, the court simply applied the state statute to find that Hoover was a liable successor and

82. /d. at 1246.
83. /d.
84. /d.
85. /d.
86. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 1997 WL 792675, *I (9th
Cir. 1997).
87. See supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 36-48.
89. See Atchison, 1997 WL 792675, at *5.
90. /d.
91. Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1244-45 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing
Mich. Comp. Laws § 450.1834(e) (1990)).

351]

SUPERFUND LIABILITY

363

then addressed the disputed issue whether a liable successor under state
law is a PRP under CERCLA.
For these reasons the formation of a federal common law, in the
context of asset purchasers, must be examined closely. It is one thing to
extend CERCLA liability, as the Anspec court did, to an asset purchaser
whom traditional state corporate law deems to be a liable successor. It is an
altogether different thing to take the next step of extending CERCLA liability, as courts applying the substantial continuation test have done, to an
asset purchaser whom traditional state corporate law has never deemed to
be a liable successor. In Louisiana-Pacific the Ninth Circuit held that
"Congress expected the courts to develop a federal common law to supplement [CERCLA]." 92 However, in Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v.
Brown & Bryant, Inc., the Ninth Circuit diverged from its prior opinion in
Louisiana-Pacific and held that there was "no need for a federal common
law of successor liability under CERCLA, and that state law supplies the
rule of decision in this area." 93
2.

The Atchison court's analysis

In Atchison, Brown & Bryant, Inc. operated a agricultural chemical
business on property leased to it by Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway. In the mid 1980's, state and federal agencies began investigating the
property for contamination and ultimately required Brown & Bryant to
clean up the site. Since Brown & Bryant could not afford the entire cost of
the cleanup, the EPA required the Railway company, as owners of the
land, to pay the balance. Brown & Bryant realized that it could not afford
the cost of the required cleanup and decided to sell the business to its
competitors. One half of Brown & Bryant's equipment was sold to
PureGro. Subsequently the Railway company sued PureGro as a PRP,
claiming PureGro was a successor in interest. 94
In Atchison, the Ninth Circuit cites two Supreme Court cases 95 which
"call into question the ease with which Louisiana-Pacific created a set of
federal rules .... These cases counsel that the need for such special federal rules will be only in 'few and restricted instances.' " 96 The court reasoned that before fashioning a federal common law, courts should first
look at "whether Congress intended federal judges to develop their own
rules or to incorporate state law .... If there is no congressional directive,

92.
93.
94.
95.
666 (U.S.
96.

Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir. 1990).
Atchison, 1997 WL 792675, at *1.
/d. at * 1-2.
See O'Me1veney & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79 (1994) and Atherton v. FDIC, 117 S.Ct.
1997).
Atchison, 1997 WL 792675, at *3 (citation omitted).
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then a court should tum to the three part test articulated in United States v.
Kimbell Foods, lnc." 97 The court in Atchison concluded that since
"CERCLA lacks any clear directive that federal court develop standards
for successor liability,"98 courts must tum to the Kimbell Foods test in order to determine whether a supplemental federal rule, such as the substantial continuity approach, is necessary. We tum now to an examination of
the Kimbell Foods test.

3.

Factors for determining whether fashioning federal common law is
improper

In Kimbell Foods, the Supreme Court noted that only under certain
circumstances should federal common law be fashioned. The court must
determine (a) whether the law requires a "nationally uniform body of law;"
(b) whether "application of state law would frustrate specific objectives of
the federal program ... ; and (c) to what "extent ... application of a federal rule would disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state
law."99
a. Whether there is a need for a nationally uniform body of law. As
noted earlier, those courts applying the substantial continuity approach
have argued that application of traditional corporate law would frustrate
the remedial purposes of CERCLA. However, "neither the language nor
the legislative history of CERCLA provides a basis for concluding that the
creation of a uniform federal common law rule of successorship liability
was intended." 100 In addition, it is apparent that application of the traditional corporate law regarding asset purchasers would not hinder a national
uniform body of law. After all, there is already a universal acceptance of
the traditional view that asset purchasers are not liable as successors unless
one of the four exceptions applies. 101 "Without a showing that state law is
inadequate to achieve the federal interest, 'we discern no imperative need
to develop a general body of federal common law to decide cases such as
this.' " 102 Thus, by fashioning a new federal common law, the courts which
have applied the substantial continuity approach have actually disrupted
the national uniformity which already existed. Indeed, if the courts' pri-

97. !d. at 3. (citing U.S. v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979)).
98. Atchison, 1997 WL 792675, at *4.
99. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728-29.
100. Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1248 (6th Cir. 1991) (Kennedy,
Circuit Justice, concurring).
101. City Management Corp. v. U.S. Chemical Co., 43 F.3d 224, 251 (6th Cir. 1994).
102. Anspec, 922 F.2d at 1249 (Kennedy, Circuit Justice, concurring) (quoting Wilson v.
Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 673, (1979).
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mary concern was to foster national uniformity, then the courts should
have utilized traditional corporate law as it already existed. 103
In Carolina Transformer, the court argued in favor of applying the
substantial continuity test because of the "national interest in the uniform
enforcement of CERCLA." 104 It is difficult to understand how the court
concluded this in light of the fact that a majority of states currently utilize
traditional corporate law regarding the liability of asset purchasers under
Superfund. 105
[T]he law in the fifty states on corporate dissolution and successor liability is largely uniform . . . . The argued 'need' for
uniformity thus stems not from disarray among the various
states, but from the alleged need for a more expansive view of
successor liability than state law currently provides-in other
words, the notion that state law on this issue is inadequate for
CERCLA's purposes. 106

The Supreme Court has ruled that implementation of federal common
law requires a "significant conflict between some federal policy or interest
and the use of state law." 107 In Atchison the court reasoned that to
demonstrate "such a conflict, more than speculation is required-there must
be a 'specific, concrete federal policy or interest that is compromised' by
the application of state law." 108 Thus the court found no reason in Atchison
to develop a federal law simply to provide a more expansive view of successor liability.
b. Whether application of the traditional corporate law of successor
liability would frustrate the purposes of CERCLA. Each of the circuits
which applied the substantial continuity approach to CERCLA argued that
traditional corporate law would frustrate the intent of Congress, which is to
impose the cleanup costs on the responsible parties rather than the taxpayers.109
In Carolina Transformer, the court was concerned that FayTranCo
(who purchased the assets of Carolina Transformer) would not be liable
under the traditional rules of successor liability. 110 Apparently FayTranCo

103. ld. (The court states "the law in the fifty states on corporate dissolution and successor
liability is largely uniform").
104. United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 837 (4th Cir. 1992).
I 05. See supra note 1.
106. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 1997 WL 792675, *4 (citing
Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1249 (6th Cir. 1991).
107. O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994).
108. Atchison, 1997 WL 792675, at *5 (citing O'Melveny, 512 U.S. at 87).
109. See Carolina Transformer, 978 F.2d at 837; United States v. Mexico Feed 980 F.2d 478,
487 (8th Cir. 1992); B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505, 514 (2d Cir. 1996).
110. Carolina Transformer, 978 F.2d at 838.
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was fraudulently formed merely to avoid CERCLA liability, and thus the
court felt it necessary to utilize the substantial continuity approach in order
to hold FayTranCo liable. However, the Atchison court reasoned that "[i]n
the cases in which the broader exception has been applied to hold an asset
purchaser liable, there has almost always been some fraudulent intent and
collusion present, in which case the purchaser would have likely already
have been liable under another traditional exception-the fraudulently-entered transaction exception."IJI The court then cited Carolina Transformer
as just such an example.
It is important to note that the owners and operators of FayTranCo
were the same owners and operators of Carolina Transformer. Thus, these
individuals could be, and ultimately were held to be, personally liable as
corporate officers of Carolina Transformer. The result was that the responsible parties were held liable for the cost of the cleanup even without the
use of the substantial continuity test.
"To date, the EPA has focused its efforts, with considerable success,
on holding corporate officers and shareholders liable directly under
CERCLA ... by proving that they personally owned and operated the facility, or that they personally arranged for the disposal of hazardous substances."112 In Carolina Transformer, the court found two corporate officers liable as "owners" and "operators" of Carolina Transformers under
CERCLA 107(a)(l). Therefore, these two officers were jointly and severally liable for the cost of the clean-up, and the taxpayers were not burdened with the cost of the cleanup.
The standard for liability of corporate officers is rather broad. To
qualify as an "operator" does not require one to exercise actual control,
rather a majority of the courts have adopted the "authority to control" standard to determine officer liability. 113 Thus, it is more likely that the government will be able to find a party liable for the cleanup, such as a corporate
officer, and avoid burdening the taxpayers.
In determining corporate officers' liability, the court considers the extent of "the corporate officer's ownership and control of the corporation;
whether or not the corporate officer is in charge of day to day
operations ... whether or not the corporate officer could have prevented,
abated, or stopped the contamination." 114 Another theory of corporate officer liability considers the:

corporate officer's supervision and control over the handling
and disposal of hazardous substances; the nature and degree

Ill. Atchison, 1997 WL 792675, at *5.
112. 4 BATTLE & l.JPELES, supra note 4, at 276 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l) (1994)).
ll3. /d.
114. FOGLEMAN, supra note 10, at 196.
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of knowledge, responsibility, opportunity, and involvement in
the disposal process; the individual's corporate status, management duties, percentage ownership of shares, position in
the corporation's hierarchy; and responsibility for hazardous
waste disposal activities including possible illegal disposal
activities. 115
Under these theories it would be very difficult for a corporate officer
to escape liability under circumstances similar to Carolina Transformer.
Thus, it is unlikely that the taxpayers will be burdened with the cost of
cleanup simply because the asset purchasers are not liable for the cleanup.
Any party (including a corporate officer) who is found to be liable is
jointly and severally liable for the entire cost of the cleanup. 116
In Mexico Feed, the Eighth Circuit stated that one of CERCLA's essential purposes was to hold responsible parties liable. 117 Although the
court applied the substantial continuity approach, it found that the asset
purchaser was not a substantial continuation of the predecessor corporation. The court reasoned that the purchaser; (1) had been a competitor of
the selling corporation, (2) had no notice of the potential liability, and (3)
pre-existed the sale and was a larger corporation then the predecessor. 118 It
is thus evident that application of the traditional corporate rule would not
frustrate the federal purposes of CERCLA in this case, since application of
the traditional rule would have reached the same result. That is, under either the traditional theory or the substantial continuity approach, the asset
purchaser would not have been liable.
In addition, "CERCLA does not require that federal law displace state
laws governing corporate existence and vicarious liability unless the state
laws permit action prohibited by the Act, or unless 'their application
would be inconsistent with the federal policy underlying the cause of action.' " 119 In determining whether or not a state law is inconsistent with
federal policy, the Supreme Court has stated that there must be some
"concrete evidence that adopting state law would adversely affect [federal
interests]." 120 Thus, "generalized pleas for uniformity" are not, by themselves, sufficient to determine inconsistency between state law and federal
policy. 121 "CERCLA 'provides a mechanism for cleaning up hazardouswaste sites ... and imposes the costs of the cleanup on those responsible

115. ld. at 197.
116. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(l) (1994).
117. United States v. Mexico Feed, 980 F.2d 478, 487 (8th Cir. 1992).
118. !d. at 489.
119. Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1250 (6th Cir. 1991) (Kennedy,
Circuit Justice, concuning) (quoting Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 465 (1975)).
120. !d. (quoting United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 730 (1979)).
121. !d. at 1250.
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for the contamination' .... There is no evidence that the application of
state corporation law will frustrate this objective." 122
There is a concern that some states might engage in a "race to the bottom" by having less stringent environmental laws than other states, in order to attract corporate business. However, as one circuit judge noted,
"[s]tates have a substantial interest in protecting their citizens and state
resources. Most states have their own counterparts to CERCLA and the
EPA and they share a complementary interest with the United States in
enforcement of laws like CERCLA ... .'' 123 Thus it is unlikely that a state
would sacrifice the health and safety of its citizens in order to attract
businesses, and currently "[n]o state provides a haven for liable companies. Nor is there reason to think that states will alter their existing successor liability rules in a 'race to the bottom' to attract corporate business. " 124
c. Whether the application of the substantial continuity test would
disrupt the purposes of traditional corporate law. Application of the substantial continuity approach would frustrate the commercial relationships
which are predicated on state law. The general rule of non-liability of asset
purchasers developed in order to "facilitate the fluid transfer of corporate
assets.'' 125 The "public has a substantial interest in the free transfer of capital and the reorganization of unprofitable businesses. Imposing liability on
a successor, when a predecessor could have provided no relief whatsoever,
is likely to severely inhibit the reorganization of, or transferring of the assets of, a failing business." 126 Finally, the "fluidity of corporate assets ...
is impeded if assets [which are] sold piecemeal are each encumbered by
the liabilities of their previous owner. " 127 Under CERCLA there is a tremendous incentive to avoid liability. If a corporation could be liable under
CERCLA merely because it purchased the assets of another corporation,
the fluidity of asset transfers will be seriously impeded as illustrated by the
"brownfields" problem.
The brownfields problem concerns corporations seeking to build industrial sites facing "strong disincentives to selecting previously developed
urban industrial sites, or brownfields." 128 The problem is that companies
will prefer to build on previously undeveloped land rather then face poten-

122. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 1997 WL 792675, *5 (9th
Cir. 1997) (citing Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)).
123. Anspec, 922 F.2d at 1250.
124. Atchison, 1997 WL 792675, at *5 (citing Anspec, 922 F.2d at 1250).
125. Upholsterers' lnt'l Union Pension Fund v. Artistic Furniture of Pontiac, 920 F.2d 1323,
1326 (7th Cir. 1990).
126. Musikiwarnba v. EESI, Inc., 760 F.2d 740, 750-51 (7th Cir. 1985).
127. EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936, 945 (7th Cir. 1988).
128. Brian C. Walsh, Seeding the Brown.fields: a Proposed Statute limiting Environmental
Liability for Prospective Purchasers, 34 HARVARD J. ON LEGIS. 191, 191 (1997).
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tial liability under CERCLA. 129 Thus, many urban sites are unable to be
sold and remain vacant or underutilized. 130 It is estimated that there are as
many as 450,000 brownfield sites nationwide. 131
A problem similar to the brownfields could occur with respect to asset
purchasers. Parties will be unwilling to purchase the assets of a corporation
who is potentially liable under CERCLA. It has been argued that the purchase price could be adjusted to reflect the potential liability. However,
because PRP's under CERCLA are jointly and severally liable, the liability
could very well exceed the cost of the assets, as one party could be forced
to pay the cost of the entire cleanup. For this reason it would be very difficult, if not impossible, for the purchase price to reflect the potential
CERCLA liability. Thus, the application of the substantial continuity approach may adversely affect the fluidity of asset transfers much like current environmental law has led to the brownfields problem.
Corporations are created under state laws and "[t]hose state laws define [the corporations'] powers, rights, and liabilities, prescribe their procedures, govern their continued existence, and define the terms upon
which mergers may occur and the effect to be given to mergers." 132 Thus,
corporations are generally formed, and continue to be governed under state
law throughout their existence. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state
that the "capacity of a corporation to sue or be sued shall be determined by
the law under which it was organized." 133 In addition, CERCLA "provides
that claims for contribution shall be brought 'in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' " 134 State law should continue to govern
corporate liabilities since the corporation came into existence under, and
continues to be governed by, state law.
Finally, the court in Atchison determined that under the Kimbell test
there was no justification for the creation of a federal common law.
Since the states already have rules in place to prevent the
use of the corporate form to avoid liability, the only possible
justification for a new federal (and more expansive) rule is to
'enrich the fund' by imposing liability on more asset purchasers .... As the Court pointed out in O'Melveny, these 'more
money' arguments are unavailing ....
O'Melveny and Atherton reaffirm the Kimbell Foods analysis and clarify the difficulty of proving the need for a federal
rule of decision. The imposition of liability under any statute

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

/d.

ld. at 198.
/d.
See supra note 82.
FED. R. Crv. P. 17(b).
See supra note 82.
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"involves a host of considerations that must be weighed and
appraised .... Within the federal system, at least, we have
decided that that function of weighing and appraising is more
appropriately for those who write laws, rather than for those
who interpret them." 135

B. Application of the Substantial Continuity Test in Labor and Products
Liability Law Cases Does Not Justify its Application in CERCLA Cases.
The substantial continuity test, or approaches similar to it, have been
used in the context of labor law and products liability. 136 However, it will
be shown that the reasoning supporting application of these broad tests in
labor and products liability law cases does not support applying this test to
CERCLA liability. In addition, CERCLA liability is potentially far more
extensive than that of either labor or products liability law.

1.

Labor law and CERCLA distinguished

The substantial continuity test stems from a U.S. Supreme Court ruling
in Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 131 a case relating to labor law. The
Court ruled that an employer who purchases the assets of a predecessor
could be liable under the National Labor Relations Act for the predecessor's unlawful discharge of an employee. The Court justified the application of the substantial continuity approach by balancing the interests of
"the bona fide successor, the public, and the affected employee." 138 The
Court concluded that the purpose of the National Labor Relations Act outweighed the interest of the purchaser because: (1) there is minimal cost to
the purchaser; (2) the potential liability may be reflected in the price the
purchaser pays for the business; or (3) the purchaser may indemnify itself
with a clause in the sales contract.
The liability for unlawfully discharging one employee in Golden State
Bottling is vastly different from the potential liability under CERCLA. Realistically, the cost of clean up and other damages under Superfund can
greatly exceed the price originally paid for the assets. Often the cost of
clean up amounts to millions, if not tens of millions, of dollars. 139 Also, it

135. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 1997 WL 792675, *5 (9th
Cir. 1997) (citing O'Melveney & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 88 (1994)).
136. United States v. Mexico Feed, 980 F.2d 478, 487-88 (8th Cir 1992).
137. 414 U.S. 168 (1973).
138. !d. at 181.
139. See, SmithK.Iine Beecham v. Rohm & Haas Co., 89 F.3d 154, 157 (3rd Cir. 1996)
(estimated clean up costs amounting to $123 million); City Management Corp. v. U.S. Chemical Co.,
43 F.3d 224, 247 (6th Cir. 1994) (response costs amounting to $44 million); Ninth Avenue Remedial
Group v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 195 B.R. 716, 720 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1996) (clean up costs
exceeding $20 million); B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505, 512 (2nd Cir. 1996) (settlement
by one party alone amounted to $5,375,000); United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d
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must be remembered that PRP's are jointly and severally liable under
CERCLA. Thus, the asset purchaser could potentially be liable for the entire cost of the cleanup. 140 Additionally, the price of the clean up often exceeds the value of the assets purchased, regardless of the purchase price.
For this reason the purchase price may not be able to be adequately
adjusted to fully compensate for any potential loss, and this in tum would
likely hinder the fluidity of assets. 141 "Neither CERCLA nor the EPA's
accompanying regulations specifies a consistent standard for determining
what constitutes a sufficient cleanup of contaminated property. As a result,
any estimate of cleanup costs is necessarily imprecise." 142 Thus, there is a
risk that "an agency official overseeing a cleanup may require significantly
more expensive procedures than the purchaser estimated." 143
Finally, the court noted in Golden State that, in regards to labor law,
the purchaser can protect himself against potential liability through an indemnification clause in the sales contract. 144 While it is true that parties
can also attempt to allocate cleanup costs among themselves, under
CERCLA they will remain jointly and severally liable to the government
for the entire cost of the cleanup. 145
To summarize, the justifications for applying the substantial continuity
approach to labor law simply do not apply to CERCLA. The cost of
cleanup is usually not minimal, but rather often amounts to millions of dollars. Also, the price of the cleanup cannot adequately be reflected in the
purchase price of the assets because the cleanup price is (1) difficult to
estimate and (2) may exceed the cost of the assets. Finally, the parties are
not able to indemnify themselves against liability in the same way that parties can in the case of labor law because, under CERCLA, the parties remain jointly and severally liable to the government, regardless of any indemnity clause.

2.

Products liability law and CERCLA distinguished

Under products liability law, a few state courts have adopted more expansive rules of successor liability beyond the four traditional exceptions
to non-liability. Two similar exceptions have developed, namely the "continuity of enterprise" exception, adopted by the Michigan Supreme

832, 841 (4th Cir. 1992) (response costs plus punitive damages amounting to nearly $4 million).
140. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 89 F.3d at 158.
141. Upholsterers' Int'I Union Pension Fund v. Artistic Furniture of Pontiac, 920 F.2d 1323,
1326 (7th Cir. 1990).
142. Walsh, supra note 128, at 199.
143. /d.
144. Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 186 (1973).
145. Smithk/ine Beecham Corp., 89 F.3d at 158.
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Court, 146 and the "product line" exception, adopted by the California Supreme Court. 147 While the "continuity of enterprise" theory is more similar
to the "substantial continuity" theory, both products liability tests will often reach similar results. 148 Without discussing the details of either view,
suffice it to say that both rules "permit liability to be imposed on an economic entity distinct from the predecessor." 149
Essentially these rules were created out of a "concern for the plight of
products liability claimants [who had] no entity to sue." 15 Conversely, the
EPA does not seek to use the substantial continuity test because they lack
entities to sue, but because they desire more entities to sue. 151 Furthermore,
nearly every other state has rejected both of these more expansive views of
successor liability, and the application of an expanded view of successor
liability is declining with regard to products liability. 152 Despite this, some
federal courts are implementing the substantial continuity test with regard
to CERCLA liability and citing the products liability arena for support of
this broad interpretation. 153
The courts that have rejected the "product line" exception have cited
various reasons. First, the product line exception would amount to "an imposition of liability without corresponding duty." 154 Second, such a theory
poses a serious risk to small businesses because of the difficulty in obtaining adequate insurance for a predecessors' product defects. 155 And third,
such a radical change from corporate law should be left to the legislature.156
Likewise courts that have rejected the "continuity of enterprise" theory
of products liability have done so for a variety of reasons. First, the successor corporation did not place the defective product onto the market and
therefore did not create the risk. 157 Second, profit received from the defective product is "received in a remote way;" thus a purchaser does not directly benefit from the predecessor's defective product. 158 Third, "the successor has not represented to the public the safety of the predecessor's

°

146. Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 875 (Mich. 1976).
147. Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 5 (Cal. 1977).
148. Santa Maria v. Owens-Illinois, 808 F.2d 848, 858 (1st Cir. 1986).
149. Michael D. Green, Successors and CERCLA: The Imperfect Analogy to Products Liability
and An Alterative Proposal, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 897, 909 (1993).
150. ld.
151. See supra note 17
152. /d.
153. /d.
154. Alfred R. Light, "Product Line" and "Continuity of Enterprise" Theories of Corporate
Successor Liability Under CERCLA, 11 MISS. C. L. REV. 63, 69 (1990).
155. ld.
156. ld.
157. /d. at 74.
158. ld.
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product." 159 Finally, other courts have noted that a successor does notreceive any profit or benefit from a predecessor's product, the successor
does not create the risk, the predecessor is not able to "enhance the safety
of a product already on the market," 160 and such a theory poses an "economic threat to small businesses." 161
These same arguments against expanding successor liability in products liability cases apply to CERCLA liability as well. For example,
"corporate successors have not created the risk of environmental harm under CERCLA and do not benefit from the predecessor's previous waste
disposal practices. A successor is normally not in a position to lessen the
danger of environmental problems ... "caused by the predecessor. 162 Also,
the EPA is never left without a means of paying for the cleanup. It can
seek payment from other PRPs or the Superfund itself. After all,
"CERCLA specifically provides for a fund to cover situations where there
are no liable parties." 163 It is not for the courts to impose liability where
liability was not intended. Additionally, such a broad policy would pose an
economic threat to all businesses, both small and large, because it would
hamper the fluidity of transfers of corporate assets due to the threat of tremendous liability. 164 For the foregoing reasons the use of the "product
line" and "continuity of enterprise" theories are not valid justifications to
hold asset purchasers liable under CERCLA beyond the traditional corporate law exceptions.
VI. CONCLUSION

In an effort to expand the reach of CERCLA, the EPA has tried to increase the number of PRP's in order to find "deep pockets" to help fund
the cost of cleanup. 165 Recognizing that under traditional corporate law
successor liability does not generally extend to asset purchasers, the EPA
has sought implementation of the "substantial continuity test." It has been
argued that under the traditional corporate law many PRP' s would escape
liability, thus frustrating the remedial purpose of CERCLA that responsible parities should pay the cost of cleanup. However, under a traditional
cash for assets transfer of property, the successor "is a distinct entity with
no involvement in hazardous waste disposal, other than its purchase of assets that belonged to the responsible party." 166 Nevertheless, some courts

159. /d.
160. /d. at 75.
161. /d.
162. /d. at 78.
163. !d. at 79.
164. See supra note 127.
165. BATTLE & LiPELES, supra note I, at 275.
166. Green, supra note 149, at 916.
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have cited the broad interpretations under labor and products liability law
in an effort to justify application of the substantial continuity theory to
CERCLA liability. However, these analogies fail primarily because of the
potentially enormous liability under CERCLA. As one author noted, "despite concerns about the federal budget deficit, we have not yet stooped to
random selection of wealthy entities to assume pieces of the governments
liabilities. Yet imposing liberal successor liability ... does exactly that. In
effect CERCLA becomes a gun-toting lunatic who randomly fires financial
bullets at those unfortunate enough to stray in the vicinity." 167

Curtis J. Busby

167.

ld.

